Announcements

- HW4 out, due Thursday, May 1
  - You'll be ready to solve all problems after today's lecture
- Project midterm reports graded and returned
- Final project reports due Thursday, May 8
  - Note: No late days allowed on final report
  - Please remember to add all group members on gradescope when you submit
- Section this week: Reading NeRF paper
- Next week's final exam review section (scheduled for May 2) likely will be moved

Adversarial Examples in Machine Learning

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USC CSCI 467, Spring 2025
April 22, 2025

Previously: Image classification



- ImageNet dataset: 14M images, 1000 labels
- **CNNs do very well at these tasks!**

Previously: ImageNet Progress



- 2012: AlexNet wins ImageNet challenge, marks start of deep learning era **(and is a convolutional neural network)**
- 2016: Machine learning surpasses human accuracy



Source: https://www.eff.org/files/AI-progress-metrics.html

Now: A “Reality Check”

- Do models really “see” images the way humans do?
- Are models learning shortcuts rather than actually solving the task?

Adversarial Examples (Today)

Spurious Correlations (Next Time)

Adversarial Examples

- **Adversarial examples**: Examples crafted by an **adversary** (attacker) to cause a desired behavior by a machine learning model
  - Can exist despite high average accuracy





Why do we care?

Security

- Fooling facial recognition systems
- Vulnerabilities of safety-critical systems (e.g. self-driving cars)
- Bypassing content moderation or spam detection

Interpretability

- Do models work the way we think they do?
- Understand model weaknesses so we can patch them
- Understand when models might not be reliable

The rules of the game

Defining the **threat model**

1. **Attack vector**: What can the adversary do?
2. **Adversary's knowledge**: What does the adversary know?
3. **Adversary's goal**: What does the adversary want to achieve?

Attack vectors

- Apply a perturbation to input (Constrained attack)



Panda
58% confidence

Nematode
8% confidence

Gibbon
99% confidence

Attack vectors

- Apply a perturbation to input (Constrained attack)
- Completely change the input (Unconstrained attack)
- Add bad training data (Data poisoning)



Adversarial perturbations for images

- Informal attack vector: Make imperceptible change to image
- How to formalize?
  - Make new image *x′* very close to *x* in pixel space
    - L2 norm: $\|x_i - x\|_2 = \sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^{d}(x_i' - x_i)^2}$
    - L-infinity norm: $\|x_i - x\|_\infty = \max_i |x_i' - x_i|$
  - Constrain norm of difference to be small, e.g. $\|x' - x\|_\infty \leq \epsilon$
    - Equivalently, $x' \in B_{\infty,\epsilon}(x)$
    - Each pixel can change by ϵ



Adversary's knowledge

White-box: Has access to model and all internals (e.g., has model parameters and code)



Black-box: Has access to model only via queries

- May also have a query budget



Adversary's goal

Undirected: Cause any error

- Facial recognition: Avoid being detected as yourself



Directed: Cause a specific (wrong) prediction

- Facial recognition: Appear to be some other specific person



Adversarial perturbations for images

- The rules of the game
  - Attack vector: Given test example *x*, replace with any $x' \in B_{\infty,\epsilon}(x)$
  - Informally: Attacker can change brightness of each pixel by at most *ε*
  - Knowledge: White box
  - Goal: Undirected (could also be directed for multi-class)



Attacking a classifier

- Problem statement for attacker
  - Binary classification, model predicts $\mathrm{sign}\left(f(x;\theta)\right)$
  - Given: Image *x*, label *y*, model parameters θ
  - Return: $x' \in B_{\infty,\epsilon}(x)$ such that $\mathrm{loss}(x', y; \theta)$ is maximized

Goodfellow et al. "Explaining and Harnessing Adversarial Examples." ICLR 2015.

Attacking a classifier

- Approximate solution ("Fast Gradient Sign Method" or FGSM)
  - Let $z = x' - x$
  - Idea: Approximate *f* locally with a linear model

$$f(x';\theta) \approx f(x;\theta) + \boxed{\nabla_x} f(x)^\top (x' - x) = \overbrace{f(x;\theta)}^{\text{Original prediction}} + \overbrace{\boxed{\nabla_x} f(x)^\top z}^{\text{Adversary controls}}$$

Gradient with respect to ***x*** (not the parameters!)

  - To increase *f*, add ε when gradient > 0, subtract ε when gradient < 0
  - Do the reverse if adversary wants to decrease *f*

$\nabla_x f(x)$	1.2	-2.8	0	2.3	
z to **increase** *f(x)*	*ε*	-*ε*	0	*ε*	(Adversary makes model predict y=+1)
z to **decrease** *f(x)*	-*ε*	*ε*	0	-*ε*	(Adversary makes model predict y=-1)

Goodfellow et al. "Explaining and Harnessing Adversarial Examples." ICLR 2015.

Defending against adversarial perturbations

- Problem statement for defender
  - Given: Dataset D and **known threat model**
    - i.e. Assume you know the norm and perturbation radius ϵ
  - Return: Model parameters θ such that attacker cannot succeed
- Adversary has advantage of going second!
  - First, you train the model
  - Then the adversary gets to attack it



A naïve defense strategy

- **Data augmentation**: Automatically generate additional training examples based on your current data
  - Often a good strategy in general, but not here…
- Random data augmentation
  - Randomly add noise to training examples *x* within $B_{\infty,\epsilon}(x)$
  - Train on this augmented data
- Problem: Adversary is choosing worst-case perturbation, may be much worse than random perturbation!




Loss (lower = better)
Examples
Perturbations
Original input
Perturbations


Loss (lower = better)
Data augmentation chooses a few points
Examples
Perturbations
Original input
Perturbations


Loss (lower = better)
Worst-case input
Examples
Perturbations
Original input
Perturbations

Anticipating the adversary

- Normal training loss function: $$\min_{\theta} \sum_{(x,y)\in D} \text{loss}(x, y; \theta)$$

- What we want to optimize instead: $$\min_{\theta} \sum_{(x,y)\in D} \max_{x' \in B_\epsilon(x)} \text{loss}(x', y; \theta)$$

Choose the parameter that minimizes training loss…

On the perturbation that the optimal adversary would choose **against this model!**

Adversarial training

- How can we optimize $\min_{\theta} \sum_{(x,y)\in D} \max_{x'\in B_\epsilon(x)} \ell(y \cdot f(x';\theta))$?
- Run an attack algorithm A (e.g., FGSM) **against current model** to generate $x' = A(x, y; \theta)$
- Plug it in: $\min_{\theta} \sum_{(x,y)\in D} \ell(y \cdot f(\underbrace{A(x, y; \theta)}_{\text{Adversarial example for current model}}); \theta))$

Adversarial example **for current model**

- Implementation: Every time you want to do a gradient step, first run the attack, then do gradient step on the adversarial example

Goodfellow et al. "Explaining and Harnessing Adversarial Examples." ICLR 2015.

NLP: Adversarial Unicode attacks

- Images: We could have some **actually imperceptible** perturbations
- Text equivalent: Unicode characters that look like ASCII characters

I. Introduction

Do x and x look the same to you? They may look identical to humans, but not to most natural-language processing systems. How many characters are in the string "123"? If you guessed 100, you're correct. The first example contains the Latin character x and the Cyrillic character h, which are typically rendered the same way. The second example contains 97 zero-width non-joiners[1] following the visible characters.

[1] Unicode character U+200C

Boucher et al. "Bad Characters: Imperceptible NLP Attacks." 2021.

NLP: Typo-based attacks

- Adversarially chosen typos can also cause misclassification
- Think about an RNN or Transformer
  - Input is a set of word vectors
  - Add a typo = completely different word vector for that word!

Alteration	Movie Review	Label
Original	A triumph, relentless and beautiful in its downbeat darkness	+
Swap	A triumph, relentless and beuatiful in its downbeat darkness	–
Drop	A triumph, relentless and beautiful in its dwnbeat darkness	–
+ Defense	A triumph, relentless and beautiful in its downbeat darkness	+
+ Defense	A triumph, relentless and beautiful in its downbeat darkness	+

NLP: Meaning preserving attacks

- Can keep meaning the same (e.g. *"What has"* -> *"What's"*)
- Security case
  - Alter model prediction while maintaining equivalent meaning to a reader
    - SEO, Plagiarism detection
- Interpretability case
  - Surprising if model succeeds on one input but fails on another that people would think of as equivalent

In the United States especially, several high-profile cases such as Debra LaFave, Pamela Rogers, and Mary Kay Letourneau have caused increased scrutiny on teacher misconduct.

(a) Input Paragraph

Q: What has been the result of this publicity?
A: increased scrutiny on teacher misconduct

(b) Original Question and Answer

Q: What haL been the result of this publicity?
A: teacher misconduct

(c) Adversarial Q & A (Ebrahimi et al., 2018)

Q: What's been the result of this publicity?
A: teacher misconduct

(d) **Semantically Equivalent Adversary**

Ribeiro et al. "Semantically Equivalent Adversarial Rules for Debugging NLP Models." ACL 2018.

Jailbreaking language models

- Language models like ChatGPT are trained to not respond to malicious requests
- But often possible to "jailbreak"—force model to answer the question anyway
- Challenge: User can input anything—attack surface is very large!



Zou et al. "Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Models." arXiv 2023.

Jailbreaking vision+language models

- Adversarially perturbs a benign-looking image to look like something dangerous (e.g., make a tree look like a bomb to vision model)
- Can be used to jailbreak vision+language models



Shayegani et al. "Jailbreak in pieces: Compositional Adversarial Attacks on Multi-Modal Language Models." arXiv 2023.

Summary: Adverarial Examples

- White-box attack strategy (**Fast Gradient Sign Method**)
  - Optimal for linear model (Homework!)
  - Approximate for neural model
- Training-time defense (**Adversarial Training w/ FGSM**)
  - Guards against optimal attack for linear model (Homework!)
  - Guards against approximate attack for neural model
- Most famous in images, but can occur in any modality
- **If someone wants to break your machine learning model, they probably can**